Vineeta Yadav

Vineeta Yadav
Associate Professor
(814) 867-3715
331 Pond Lab
Department of Political Science, College of the Liberal Arts

Ph.D. Yale University 2007. Professor Yadav’s research and teaching interests lie in comparative politics, political economy, economic development, and survey research. Her research specifically focuses on the political and policy consequences of institutional design, the comparative study of interest-group behaviors and, their consequences for political outcomes and policy outcomes, judicial politics in developing countries and, economic development. She specializes in the politics of Brazil, India and China and has conducted field research and surveys in all three countries. Her second book Democracy, Electoral Systems and Judicial Empowerment in Developing Countries (co-authored with Bumba Mukherjee) has just been published by the University of Michigan Press (March, 2014). Her first book Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries (Oxford University Press, 2011) was awarded the 2013 Leon Epstein Outstanding Book Prize by the APSA Political Organizations and Parties Section, the 2012 Rosenthal Prize by the APSA Legislative Studies Section and received an Honorable Mention for the 2012 best book award from the APSA Comparative Democratization Section. She has also published in Comparative Political Studies,Party Politics , International Interactions and Journal of Public Affairs. Her third book, The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships (co-authored with Bumba Mukherjee) is forthcoming at Cambridge University Press (Dec.,2015). She is currently working on projects that study the determinants of presidential and parliamentary regime choice,elite learning of institutional behaviors in unconsolidated democracies, the internal politics of Islamist and secular parties in democratic regimes and their consequences for judicial and media independence, the influence of economic interest groups on democratic transitions and, the politics of decisions to adopt, avoid or abandon commercial courts and their economic and political consequences. Her work on institutional choice in unconsolidated democracies has received financial support from the National Science Foundation.